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Abstract In this article we develop a typology of European Union (EU) integration to
capture how, to what extent and according to which policy aims EU involvement in
Member States has altered with respect to labour market and social policy and what
it signifies in terms of institutional change. On this basis, we show first that new
instruments – the Six-Pack, Fiscal Compact and Two-Pack – have been layered onto the
existing institutional framework governing the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
Furthermore, we show that the instruments strengthening budgetary discipline to
improve the functioning of European Monetary Union have become more explicit in
terms of policy objectives, particularly specifying new benchmarks to obtain fiscal dis-
cipline. They are also stricter in terms of surveillance and enforcement. Second, we
show that there are initiatives to address and improve the social dimension of the EU –
Europe 2020, the Social Investment Package and the Youth Guarantee – and that these
have also emerged through a process of institutional layering. However, the aims around
Europe 2020 and Social Investment continue to be based on the voluntary Open Method
of Coordination, with comparatively weak surveillance and enforcement. In the current
context, and in order to attain economic growth together with social cohesion and wel-
fare, it is of utmost importance that EMU criteria should be altered to take account of
social investments.
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Introduction: The European Union (EU) and Social Policy
The EU aims to safeguard and promote high social standards across the EU, but
respecting welfare state diversity (Scharpf, 2002). Since the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) was institutionalised in 1992, the EU intervenes indirectly – as a
functional spill-over from monetary integration – in social and fiscal policy. In 1997,
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – a process of policy coordination with EU
benchmarks and policies, national reports and EU surveillance as well as corrective
mechanisms in case of deviation from these aims – was developed to ensure
compliance with EMU aims. Most important in this initial institutional architecture
are the limits for public debt (maximum 60 per cent of GDP) and budget deficits
(maximum 3 per cent of GDP). As social spending makes up the biggest share of
public expenditure in Member States (more than half of total government expenditure
was devoted to the functions ‘social protection’ and ‘health’ between 2002 and 2012
according to Eurostat figures), the pressure on national welfare states exerted by the
SGP is therefore considerable, especially during economic recessions.
The core actors involved in EMU governance are economically oriented, that is
DG ECFIN, and the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs as well as the
European Central Bank. These actors are all concerned with upholding the monetarist
paradigm, and with it supply-side policies, such as labour market de-regulation as
well as cost containment in areas such as pensions and health care (Scharpf, 2011;
Barbier, 2012; de la Porte and Pochet, 2014). The SGP and the monetarist paradigm
that underpins it, has not been without criticism. McNamara (2005, p. 156) notes,
‘Although the SGP has the word “growth” in its title, it is not likely to promote
growth, but rather to be excessively restrictive at precisely the times that European
states may need to stimulate their economies, as states are more likely to run up
deficits in economic recessions’.
In the mid-1990s and as a response to the EMU and the functional spill-overs on
(pressure to decrease) social expenditure, the development of a ‘social dimension’ to
the EU was seen as indispensable by left-of-centre political actors. The notion of a
‘European Social Model’ represents the idea that European welfare states are
legitimately diverse, but that they all aim to uphold high social standards, working
conditions and well-being, which should be supported by the EU (Jepsen and Serrano
Pascual, 2005). In core welfare state areas, where Member States face similar
challenges, such as unemployment, ageing populations and new social risks, the EU
has promoted various ideas, for example, ‘flexicurity’ (Viebrock and Clasen, 2009),
‘active ageing’ or a ‘lifecourse’ approach to labour market participation – facilitating
breaks from the labour market for education, parenting and care responsibilities
without potential loss of job.
These policy ideas, many of them central in the emerging ‘social investment’
paradigm (Morel et al, 2012) have been promoted through the European Employ-
ment Strategy (EES) and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), thereby
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contributing to the development of the ‘European Social Model’, although only
through voluntary policy coordination. These policies have been promoted by
‘socially oriented actors’, that is, DG Employment and Social Affairs and the
Employment and Social Affairs Council. Compared with the ‘economically oriented
actors’ they have a weak legal basis for influencing welfare state reforms. Indeed, all
decisions about the organisation, financing and delivery of social security have thus
far remained at national level. While some countries have adopted common EU
policy ideas through the OMC, its overall impact on welfare reforms has been weak
(de la Porte and Pochet, 2012).
However, even the Treaty-based and thus much more enforceable SGP had its
limitations. In the asymmetrical architecture of the EMU, monetary policy is pooled
at EU level, while fiscal policy remains uncomfortably caught between EU and
national level through EU pressure to curb public finances, but without direct or
formal EU competency in this area (Scharpf, 2002; McNamara, 2005). While some
Member States did undertake substantial reforms to comply with the Maastricht
criteria before the 2007 financial crisis (see, for example, Hassenteufel et al, 2000;
Jessoula, 2012), the SGP was not sufficient to keep all countries within the set limits
(De Haan et al, 2004; McNamara, 2005). When the 2007 global financial crisis laid
bare the asymmetries within the Eurozone and problems with the SGP’s enforce-
ment, this led to an incremental alteration of instruments and policies that affect
welfare state reform, both indirectly, via the architecture of the EMU, especially
regarding fiscal policy, and directly, aiming to affect welfare policy per se.
In this article, we analyse how the instruments developed in response to the crisis
have altered the existing EU institutional framework with regard to labour market
and social policy. In the next section, we develop the analytical framework,
consisting first of a typology for detecting changes in EU integration and involve-
ment and second, of a clarification of concepts to analyse institutional change. In
the subsequent section, we analyse how new instruments have been developed
since the onset of the crisis that affect the EMU and the social dimension. First, we
analyse the development of instruments in the governance of fiscal and budgetary
policy. We find that they have become more precise in terms of objectives, and
stricter in terms of surveillance and enforcement, and that new instruments have been
grafted onto existing institutional frameworks through a process of layering. There-
after, we analyse the development of instruments more directly aimed at social and
labour market policy. The findings show that the new initiatives have been layered
onto the existing foundation in Europe 2020, but that they are weak in terms of
surveillance and enforcement. This signifies that their potential impact is weak
compared with the instruments governing policy via the EMU. In the penultimate
section, we analyse the implications of the findings for European social policy.
Overall, we find that the alteration of the EMU governance framework with its
pressure on fiscal consolidation, and as a side-kick the Social investment strategy
developed in a weaker framework, penetrate deeper into welfare state policies than
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before the crisis. Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the significance of the new
EU governance instruments for welfare states and the process of European Integration.
Analytical Framework for Analysing Alterations in EU Integration in
Labour Market and Social Policy
In this section, we develop a typology of ‘EU integration’ to analyse the main new
instruments since the crisis and their significance for labour market and social policy
along three dimensions: objectives (policy aims), surveillance process and mechanisms
of enforcement. For each, there are four possible degrees of EU involvement (from low
to very high). Furthermore, a transversal issue we consider is the balance of actors
involved, in devising policy objectives, and in the surveillance and enforcement
processes. We argue that including employment and social policy actors (or other
issue-specific actors) within a policy process provides a more comprehensive
approach, for example, considering economic but also social sustainability aims,
compared with processes driven exclusively or mainly by actors in economic and
financial affairs, which are more narrowly focused on aims of fiscal consolidation.
Second, to render this analysis dynamic and longitudinal, we analyse how these
instruments and policies have altered the EU institutional framework governing
economic, labour market and social policy over time, with the use of four key concepts
from the literature on incremental institutional change: layering refers to creating a new
policy grafted onto an existing institutional framework; revision refers to the formal
reform, replacement or elimination of existing policy; policy drift refers to the altered
effect of a policy because of changed circumstances, and conversion refers to
redirection of an existing policy framework for new purposes1 (Hacker, 2004).
The first dimension of integration is objectives (policy aims), that is, how precisely
and to which magnitude policy change is suggested, which is a first indicator of the
depth of EU involvement in Member States’ social and employment policy, where
EU competencies are marginal. We consider EU involvement as low if no change in
objectives is required, but only minor changes to existing policies are suggested.
Medium EU involvement would be indicated by more alterations, but without
changing the institutional set-up. High (and very high) levels of involvement signify
alterations with the potential for undermining the existing institutional structure and
fundamental principles of a policy area, thus indicating a high amount of external
pressure. Some objectives, such as adjusting the levels of pension benefits, would
represent a medium level of EU involvement, as it does not signify new principles of
organising pension policy, but just an alteration within an existing institutional
set-up. A policy aim such as enhancing social sustainability of pension systems
would imply low involvement unless this aim were accompanied by specific
measures, while a policy aim suggesting reform of the existing pension system
would signify high or very high EU involvement. In practice, and as we know from
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research on Europeanisation of welfare policies, any policy objective would have a
differentiated effect in Member States depending on a wide range of issues in the
domestic arena, such as ideas, politics and markets. For example, in familialistic
welfare states the promotion of formal childcare policies (such as targets for the
number of children in early childhood education) may be seen as high EU
involvement because it challenges the existing male breadwinner/female carer model
and demands a significant change in policy objectives. In the Nordic welfare states,
by contrast, such a policy merely confirms or re-enforces the existing policy
paradigm that supports the reconciliation of work with family life and EU
involvement would thus be low. However, it is necessary to consider not only
domestic factors and the institutional fit with EU policy objectives, but also which
type of EU surveillance and enforcement they are exposed to.
The second dimension of EU involvement is thus the surveillance of national
policy by EU actors, which addresses with which mechanism the EU is endowed to
monitor whether Member States are implementing the agreed policies and moving
towards EU benchmarks and/or national targets. The strength of surveillance is
indicated by the frequency of policy monitoring and on whether the basis for
surveillance is soft or hard law. It is also important to take account of which EU
actors are involved in a particular surveillance process. Some EU actors, namely the
economic and financial actors, operate in areas where the EU has strong jurisdiction
so that these actors have more power than others, such as the employment and social
affairs actors, where the EU has only weak legislative competence.
The third dimension of EU involvement is enforcement, referring to the type of
measures EU actors have at their disposal to ensure implementation and/or corrective
action in the case of non-compliance with or deviation from EU policy. The most
coercive form consists of financial sanctions, although they have never been levied.
Another form of enforcement consists of delineating a reform path and timetable to
be followed in order to achieve an EU benchmark or aim in an ‘excessive deficit
procedure’ (EDP) or ‘country specific recommendation’ (CSR). This may alter an
institution in different ways depending on the specificity of objectives and how it fits
with the existing institution. An EDP is Treaty-based and designed to ensure that
a country effectively corrects a deficit, while a recommendation under an OMC is
merely a suggestion for reform, with no consequences in the case of non-compliance.
In assessing enforcement, it is important to take account of the power balance
between European institutions and Member States. In particular, the requirement of
a qualified majority vote (QMV) gives more leverage to Member States, since
a qualified majority of Member States must agree to impose a sanction. By contrast,
a reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) gives more power to the European
Commission, because a qualified majority of Member States would need to agree not
to impose a sanction. Up to present, it is a mechanism that functions as a threat, as it
has never been applied. A very high level of enforcement, combined with very strict
surveillance, occurs in the case of countries that are under EU bail-out and have to
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subject themselves to rigorous conditionality as a consequence of loan receipt in
Memorandums of Understanding (see Theodoropoulou, this issue). In such cases,
very specific policy objectives, a very high degree of surveillance as well as
enforcement, lead to ‘intrusiveness’ in domestic settings. This particular type of EU
involvement would be captured by the last column of our typology (see Table 1).
Analysing Governance of Social and Labour Market Policy since the
Crisis
This section begins with presenting the European Semester within which all new
instruments are embedded and layered onto existing institutional foundations (see
Figure 1).
The ‘European Semester’ is a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination
within the EU, agreed in 2010 which aims to increase coherence and effectiveness of
economic and social policies. It is launched yearly by the European Commission
(2013c) via an ‘Annual Growth Survey’ (AGS) that assesses progress of the past year
and sets out EU growth and job creation priorities for the coming year.2 The European
Semester, and in particular the AGS, is very powerful for the agenda-setting process as
it gathers all policy aims, instruments and actors involved in economic, social and
labour market policy. Furthermore, it is used to forward proposals for further
strengthening the institutional architecture of the EU (European Council, 2011).
Altering the governance of EMU since 2010
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introducing EMU-pooled monetary policy at EU
level, while fiscal policy remained at national level. The 3 per cent budget deficit
criterion was closely monitored and in the event of its breach by a Member State, an
EDP could be launched. In the EDP, a plan was devised between the Member State
and the Commission in order to exit the EDP, which could include reforms in
pensions, health care or education. However, in 2005, this process was altered to take
account of public investments. This rule change was controversial as it was put
forward in the context on non-compliance with SGP criteria by France and Germany
that pointed to a politicisation and thus weakening of the process. In essence,
however, the initial institutional architecture was not altered. Before the financial
crisis of 2008, surveillance and enforcement of the SGP was medium, while the
policy aims were highly specified (de la Porte and Heins, 2014). After 2010, when
the Euro was under threat, the EU instruments governing EMU and the oversight of
Member States’ budgets were reformed. The Six-Pack, the FC and the Two-Pack
have altered the institutional framework radically, but through a process of
institutional layering rather than a revision of the existing framework.
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Table 1: Typology of EU integration of labour market and social policy
Dimension of
integration
Degree of involvement
Low Medium High Very high
Objectives
(policy aims)
Note: This
may differ
according to
welfare state
type (and
policy area)
Uncontroversial objectives,
not challenging existent
institutional
arrangements, merely
suggesting some minor
adjustments in a particular
policy area
Objectives challenging some
existing policies, but not the
underlying institutional
structure of a policy area
Objectives requiring
comprehensive policy reform
with the potential for
undermining the existing
institutional structure and
fundamental principles of
a policy area
Objectives requiring far-reaching
structural reform with a high
potential for undermining the
existing institutional structure and
for changing the fundamental
principles of a policy area
Surveillance Infrequent ex-post EU
surveillance of national
policy reports
Frequent ex-post surveillance of
national reports that specify
(country-specific) policy
which should meet common
benchmarks and/or own
national targets
Regular ex-ante and ex-post EU
surveillance of national policy
reports. MS accountable to EU
benchmarks or national targets
and required to specify action
plan to meet these
Frequent ex-ante and ex-post EU
surveillance of national policy
reports. MS accountable to their
own policies (which must aim to
meet European targets and/or
policy)
Enforcement ‘Naming and shaming’ and/
or soft recommendations
(with a weak Treaty base)
Treaty-based recommendations,
and possibility for sanctions
in the case of non-compliance
Treaty-based recommendations
and quasi-automatic financial
sanctions in the case of non-
compliance
Conditionality (specified structural
reforms) in order to receive
financial assistance
Source: Own conceptualisation (see de la Porte and Heins, 2014 for an earlier version).
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Six-pack
In December 2011, the ‘Six-Pack’3 was adopted to increase the strength and scope of
surveillance of all Member State economies with some specific rules for Eurozone
Member States, especially regarding financial sanctions. The Six-Pack introduces
several novelties that enhance European Integration regarding fiscal and macro-
economic policy in terms of precision of objectives, mechanisms of surveillance as
well as enforcement.
First, with regard to specifying and monitoring fiscal consolidation, Member
States’ budget balance shall converge towards country-specific medium-term
objectives (MTOs). Furthermore, country-specific structural balances are specified:
they can range from a structural budget deficit of 1 per cent of GDP to a budget in
surplus. These MTOs embody a high degree of surveillance compared with the
situation before the crisis. The structural budget deficit is a new benchmark that has
been added on to the original provisions in the Maastricht Treaty. The structural
deficit, together with the 3 per cent budget deficit, is seen as more accurate than the
budget deficit criterion alone as it aims to filter out temporary fiscal measures and
Instruments of fiscal 
policy coordination
Mutual 
influence of the 
two sets of 
instruments
Instruments of social and labour 
market policy coordination
Instruments 
and core 
objectives
Two-Pack 2013
Fiscal Compact 2012 Youth Guarantee 2013
Six-Pack 2011 Social Investment Package 2013
Stability and Growth 
Pact1992
Euro-plus Pact 2011
Europe 2020 (previously Lisbon 
Strategy, EES and social OMCs) 2010
Application 
of EU cycle
Immediate 
objectives
MIP, MTOs
structural deficit rule, 
debt-deficit rule
Convergence/Stability 
Programmes, DBPs
NRP, National Youth Employment 
Plans
Annual Growth Survey
EU 
enforcement 
and 
surveillance
AMR, EDP, opinions on 
DBPs
CSR, EPP commitments, Youth 
Employment Initiative, co-funding 
via ESF
Figure 1: Layering of instruments within the European Semester.
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evolutions that are because of cyclical changes in the economy (Verhelst, 2012). This
preventative approach aims to keep Member State economies healthy in good times,
rather than accumulating high deficits, and represents tighter integrated EU-Member
State surveillance of budgets, by making them accountable to their own MTOs.
Furthermore, enforcement is high: the Commission can issue a warning to a Member
State in case of significant deviation from its own adjustment path defined in the
MTO. National governments may thus have less leverage in defining (or rather
differentiating) their national political agendas (including welfare state reforms),
because of the MTO, and the structural budget deficit, which constrains their budgets
and thus plans for expansive fiscal spending, such as in social and labour market
policy (European Commission, 2013b).
A second novelty of the Six-Pack is the ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’
(MIP) with accompanying indicators that is more far-ranging than the focus on public
finances as under the original SGP. In 2012, 11 indicators were selected for a
scoreboard by DG ECFIN for monitoring the health of Member States’ economies,
including private debt, nominal unit labour costs and unemployment. This tool has
enhanced the surveillance capability of the European Commission towards Member
States. Although the Commission will take account of country-specific circum-
stances, the scoreboard represents a tool to quantitatively assess national economies.
It can lead to ‘Alert Mechanism Reports’ (AMR), that is, in-depth reviews suggesting
corrective action to ensure the health of national economies. In the first AMR, 12
Member States were subject to in-depth review, while in the second, 14 Member
States were subject to in-depth review (European Commission, 2012b).
Third, the Six-Pack increases enforcement of the SGP in case of non-compliance
since an EDP can be launched if Member States have breached either the deficit or
the debt criterion, where previously only the deficit criterion was operational.
Concerning enforcement, an EDP is launched, like before the crisis, through QMV
in the Council. The level of enforcement is therefore only medium in this respect.
However, in contrast to the situation before the crisis, the punitive aspect of
enforcement has become very high for countries not complying with the correction
of the deficits or debts according to their plans. Indeed, if no effective action has been
taken, quasi-automatic sanctions will be applied that could only be blocked by
RQMV in the Council. This means that a qualified majority of Member States
(in Ecofin) must be against a Commission (DG ECFIN) proposal for a sanction to be
overturned (Van Aken and Artige, 2013). This represents a high level of enforce-
ment. This measure is accompanied by a high degree of surveillance to verify that
agreed measures to correct the imbalance are carried out.
In sum, fiscal consolidation objectives are highly specified and EU influence can
be assessed as potentially high on this dimension as national governments have less
leverage in defining (or rather differentiating) their national policy agendas (includ-
ing welfare state reforms) because of the budget-restraining MTOs. The Six-Pack
embodies a more tightened and thus high degree of integration on the surveillance
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dimension compared with the situation before the crisis as a broader range of the
economy is considered in the surveillance of Member State budgets through the MIP.
In addition, with the new structural budget deficit criteria a new benchmark has been
added to the 3 per cent budget deficit criterion of the original Maastricht Treaty.
Finally, the Six-Pack increases the enforcement of the SGP in case of non-
compliance since an EDP can be launched if Member States have breached either
the deficit or the debt criterion, where previously only the deficit criterion was
decisive. The Six-Pack thus introduces benchmarks, mechanisms and processes
through which to improve the plausibility of meeting the fiscal consolidation aims of
the EMU and of preventing future crises. This has an indirect but strong spill-over on
welfare policy, to which a large part of public expenditure is devoted.
Fiscal Compact
The Fiscal Compact, added in 2012, is another legislative initiative that strengthens the
aim of fiscal consolidation, together with surveillance and enforcement measures.4
It complements and further reinforces the SGP by including an automatic correction
mechanism in the case of significant deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path
towards it and strengthens the automaticity of the EDP. It is binding for all euro area
Member States, while other Member States will be bound once they adopt the euro or,
upon their discretion, earlier and with the possibility to choose the provisions they wish
to comply with (European Parliament and European Council, 2011).
The Fiscal Compact specifies the rules for curtailing public debt in case that the
limit of 60 per cent of GDP is exceeded.5 It also requires that Member States
converge towards country-specific MTOs with a limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP on
structural deficits, also coined the ‘golden rule’ (Verhelst, 2012). This can be
extended to 1 per cent for Eurozone countries with a debt ratio significantly below
60 per cent of GDP. Economists expect future MTOs to converge towards the
0.5 per cent benchmark, which should be integrated in Member State constitutions,
because it would force Eurozone countries to have balanced budgets in good times
and render the likelihood of more than 3 per cent deficits less likely in economic
downturns (Verhelst, 2012). There is some flexibility, since the golden rule can be
temporarily disregarded in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, the structural
deficits enshrined in both the Six-Pack and the Fiscal Compact imply a high degree of
enforcement and represent a further step in European Integration by imposing
Eurozone-fiscal discipline. However, even economists are concerned about the
stringency of the golden rule, since it ‘risks obstructing public investments that
address long-term challenges such as ageing and the shift towards a green economy.
It seems therefore preferable that the implementation of the golden rule considers
public investments. If not, Eurozone countries will, perhaps sensibly, be inclined to
circumvent their golden rule’ (Verhelst, 2012, p. 3). In the case of circumventing the
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norms laid down by the Fiscal Compact, the ECJ can impose financial sanctions of up
to 0.1 per cent of GDP in case of non-compliance, which reinforces the corrective
enforcement (European Central Bank (ECB), 2012, p. 83).
Another novelty is that Member States must report on their national debt issuance
to the Commission and the Council. This entails the expectation to discuss ex ante ‘all
major policy reforms’, which suggests that it is negotiable bi-laterally with each
Member State, taking due account of circumstances. The FC strengthens the enforce-
ment mechanism of the SGP, since all stages of the EDP should be implemented within
a clearly defined time frame. When the Commission considers that an excessive deficit
exists, this decision can only be overturned by RQMV. The Fiscal Compact thus
strengthens the decision-making capacity of the Commission (compared with the Six-
Pack) and reduces the political discretion of the EU Council because of RQMV. The
measures for exiting an EDP and the timetable are negotiated between the Commission
and the Member State, as was the case in the original SGP. Thus, there is some room for
negotiation although the threat of bad credit ratings from international rating agencies
culminating in a sovereign debt crisis may incite Member States to follow reform paths
developed with the Commission more closely (see contributions in this issue; de la Porte
and Natali, 2014).
The Fiscal Compact, focused on fiscal discipline, builds on the Six-Pack, but
makes the aims with regard to structural deficits even more stringent. Surveillance is
high as Member States must discuss major reforms with the European institutions
before their adoption. Ultimately, it reduces Member States’ room for manoeuvre
with regard not only to fiscal consolidation, but also structural reforms, such as in
health care, pensions and labour markets. Moreover, the Fiscal Compact requires
Member States to include the country-specific MTOs in national binding law,
preferably at constitutional level. The instrument represents yet another initiative
layered onto an existing institutional framework, rather than revision, since none of
the previous instruments are replaced.
Two-Pack
The Two-Pack, which came into force in May 2013, is a third initiative that has been
layered onto the existent instruments governing the EMU (European Commission,
2013b). It specifies objectives in budgetary policy, together with high enforcement
and surveillance mechanisms.6 Its novelty is to have introduced a common budgetary
timeline and rules for all euro area countries. The Two-Pack has a significant impact
on ‘sovereign’ budgets – the basis for policymaking – as it requires Member States to
send their budget proposals first for approval to the Commission and the Eurogroup,
before they are submitted to national parliaments.
The fact that national budgets, and thus details of (welfare) policy reforms, are the
object of close scrutiny with strong potential for the EU to intervene in reform plans
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implies that euro area countries are now developing budgets in the shadow of EU
surveillance. The Commission and the Eurogroup in their first assessment of
Eurozone countries’ Draft Budgetary Plans7 have concluded that only two countries
were ‘compliant’, three were ‘compliant without any margin for possible slippage’,
three were ‘broadly compliant’ with ‘some deviation from the adjustment path
towards the MTO’, and five were in the category ‘at the risk of non-compliance’. On
this basis, recommendations were made to these countries. It is only in the case of
‘particularly serious non-compliance’ that the Commission may request a revision of
the draft budgetary plan. It remains to be seen how effective enforcement will be and
how precisely the Commission could require alterations in national budgets. Still, it
represents much more interference in Member State budgets compared with before
the crisis.
Altering the Governance of the European Social Dimension since 2010
In this section, we discuss how social policy aims and instruments per se have
been altered in the wake of the crisis and what this signifies for the European
Social dimension. The coordination of European social and labour market
policy was coordinated in the EES and various OMCs that have been institutio-
nalised in the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 with the aim to achieve high levels of
employment in combination with high levels of social protection. Pre-crisis, EU
influence on setting policy objectives was medium, while the surveillance and
enforcement of measures were low because the Lisbon Strategy was governed by
the OMC (de la Porte and Heins, 2014). The Lisbon Strategy has been replaced
(an instance of revision from the perspective of institutional change) by Europe
2020, with many of the same mechanisms, a few institutional innovations and
a reinforcement of many aims, but with weak mechanisms of surveillance and
enforcement.
Europe 2020
In June 2010, a new 10-year growth strategy coined ‘Europe 2020’ replaced the
Lisbon Strategy as the main social and labour market policy instrument at
European level (European Commission, 2010b). Like the new instruments
governing EMU, Europe 2020 first insists on fiscal consolidation in the crisis
context. Beyond that, it is designed to deliver growth, if possible, socially and
environmentally sustainable growth, requiring immediate investments, but to pay
off later in terms of economic growth, as well as social well-being and equality as
well as a greener environment. However, this strategy is dependent on significant
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government expenditure that governments encumbered by a high public debt are
hardly able to provide.
Europe 2020 is organised around five EU Headline Targets, which are supported
by 10 ‘Integrated Guidelines’ covering economic, environmental, employment
and social issues, and seven ‘flagship initiatives’, the latter being novel institu-
tional innovations. The policies adopted in these areas are to be reported in
‘National Reform Programmes’ (NRPs). Concerning the policy objectives, two of
the Integrated Guidelines are devoted to employment policy, and one to social
exclusion, while there are no targets or guidelines for social protection issues. The
aim to increase labour market participation stands stronger than ever – the
previous benchmark of an average overall employment rate of 70 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent (European Commission, 2010b). The ‘Agenda for new skills
and jobs’ is the flagship initiative that aims at supporting this aim, but also at
ensuring workers are skilled and adaptable to the altering aims on the labour
market. Concrete proposals of this agenda are to improve flexicurity, to equip the
work force with appropriate skills for the modern labour market, to improve job
quality and working conditions, and, finally, to improve job creation. Employment
subsidies or targeted reductions of non-wage labour costs as well as the promotion
of self-employment – arguably of precarious character in the context of a crisis –
are among the suggested measures for job creation (European Commission,
2010a). These policies are by and large the same as those developed under the
preceding Lisbon Strategy (2000–2010).
The social aim consists of promoting social inclusion, intimately linked to
increasing labour market participation, and combating poverty. Under Europe
2020 Member States have committed to ‘lift at least 20 million people out of the
risk of poverty and exclusion’ by 2020 (European Council, 2011). Member States
have to specify their own national targets in this area. These targets are not very
ambitious, which suggests a lack of real political will to take the EU target
seriously (de la Porte and Weishaupt, 2013). Another flagship initiative – the
‘European platform against poverty and social exclusion’ – supports the social
exclusion aim of the EU. The degree of EU involvement regarding the Europe
2020 objectives is low for poverty reduction, while it is medium for objectives
such as activation and raising employment rates.
EU surveillance of Europe 2020 is medium, as it takes place ex-post as part of an
iterative policy cycle, now coordinated in the European Semester. On the basis of
the NRPs, CSRs are be made to Member States, suggesting policies to be adopted
for reaching the broad policy aims delineated in Europe 2020. Enforcement of the
CSRs is low as the adoption of the suggested measures is voluntary. Existing
evidence on CSRs on employment policies shows that they have at times been
sources of inspiration for reform (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012). However,
overall impact is low, particularly under conditions of fiscal constraint and low
growth.
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The Euro-Plus Pact (EPP)
The EPP, adopted in March 2011, is based on the OMC between the 17 Eurozone
members and six other countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania). Aiming at better economic policy coordination, it focuses on competi-
tiveness, employment and financial sustainability, including a structured discussion
on tax policy issues. It is a new initiative that has been layered onto the existing EU
institutional framework. The EPP specifies objectives that primarily fall in areas that
are under the competence of the Member States including wage monitoring, labour
market reforms, tax reforms, pensions, health care and social benefits, fiscal rules and
banking regulations.
In labour market policy, some objectives touch upon core labour market issues,
including decentralising wage-setting agreements as well as revising wage indexa-
tion mechanisms (Barnard, 2012). The EPP penetrates into sensitive national welfare
state issues, specifying objectives to a high degree. It is integrated into the European
Semester, where Member States should report on progress made towards the main
aims: surveillance is medium through analysis of progress made to issues that are
central in the EPP, alongside the assessment of progress made in other processes.
The EPP is voluntary, using the OMC, and surveillance as well as enforcement is
therefore as low as it is for Europe 2020. While each Member State has the discretion
to select their own national measures to achieve the common goals, and to decide
how far-reaching reforms should be, national commitments should be integrated in
the NRPs that are central for Europe 2020 and Stability or Convergence Programmes
in the framework of the SGP. The Commission then assesses implementation by
Member States of ‘EPP commitments’ together with the assessment of other CSRs.
Compared with the new institutional architecture around the EMU and even Europe
2020 with its headline targets and flagship initiatives, the EPP objectives are not
likely to make headway via an OMC process, since they require domestic political
commitment.
Social Investment Package (SIP) and youth guarantee
Social investment is a comprehensive paradigmatic approach that emphasises the
need to invest in individuals and their skills throughout the life-course so that they
can participate in the labour market and combine this with other priorities, such as
care responsibilities (European Commission, 2013d). It implies investing in institu-
tions for early childhood, schools, vocational training, upper tertiary education,
activation and life-long learning (see Morel et al, 2012). At the same time, temporary
leave from the labour market should be facilitated without fear of job loss. Social
investment ideas build on the foundations of the universalist welfare state, which is
designed to meet these aims (see Kvist in this issue).
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Social investment, especially since a 2013 Commission Communication on the
topic, provides an overarching policy framework to coordinate policy developed in
economic, labour market and social policy. Member States can receive CSRs in the
area of social investment through Europe 2020 (European Commission, 2013d).
What differentiates it from the social OMCs and the EES is that funding, especially
from the ESF, is intended to be better integrated with the SIP for the 2014–2020
period (European Commission, 2014). However, the EES was also combined with
European funding and even where funding was linked to the EES aims, such as in the
central and eastern European countries, the overall impact was weak (de la Porte
and Jacobsson, 2012). Policy objectives are defined to a medium degree, while
enforcement and surveillance are both weak, although they are medium if co-funding
is included in pursuing an aim under the SIP.
Parallel to the launching of the SIP, an initiative coined ‘Youth Guarantee’ was
launched in April 2013 via a Council Recommendation, because of the concern about
youth unemployment. It was another instrument layered onto the existing Europe 2020
framework. The guarantee aims to ensure that all young people under 25 get a good-
quality, concrete offer within 4 months of them leaving formal education or becoming
unemployed. This is a specific policy objective, and is coherent with the supply-side
aims of monetarism and also with the main gist of social investment. The purpose of it
is to avoid the inactivity trap among young people, particularly those not in education,
employment or training, as this could have consequences for their future. The Youth
Guarantee strengthens the aim to activate young people, which was part of the EES
already from the mid-1990s. Member State progress in this area is reported in ‘National
Youth Implementation Plans’ which have started to be reported in 2014. What is
different compared with the EES that also focused on youth is that €6 billion have been
reserved in the ‘Youth Employment Initiative’ for the implementation of the guarantee
across Member States (co-funded with Member States). If the initiatives are co-funded,
then surveillance and enforcement will be medium; otherwise, they are low.
Assessing the Institutional Alterations of EMU and the European Social
Dimension
Altogether, the Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack have incrementally,
and in rapid succession, been grafted onto the existing institutional framework to
achieve aims of fiscal consolidation and balanced budgets already present in the
Maastricht Treaty. Although their overall aims are not novel, they represent a major leap
forward in EMU integration because of new benchmarks requiring fiscal restraint,
combined with high levels of surveillance and enforcement. Through these new
instruments, especially the monitoring of Member State budgets as well as reporting
on structural reforms, Member States are under pressure to curtail expenditure in health
care, pensions, early childhood programmes and elderly care. The AGSs highlight the
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need to keep public expenditure growth below the rate of medium-term GDP trends and
to correct macro-economic imbalances, to decrease account deficits as well as levels of
indebtedness (European Commission, 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2014). The necessary
resources to facilitate investment in human capabilities and to facilitate participation of
women on the labour market, key elements in a sustainable social investment strategy,
may not be prioritised or could be under-resourced.
Europe 2020, the main instrument to foster the European Social Dimension, has
aimed to address the social and other non-monetary aspects of EMU and the EU.
However, Europe 2020 and the instruments grafted onto it, in particular the SIP, are
developed under the monetarist paradigm. Thus, instruments addressing social
consequences of the crisis, for example, the Youth Guarantee frame policy responses
that lean on supply-side policies. This was the case before the crisis as well, but the
instruments and aims for fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and structural
deficits were not nearly as constraining, effectively allowing for legitimate diversity.
Now, the possibilities for diversity have become more limited through the framework
and aims around fiscal and budgetary constraint.
However, since the immediate effects of the crisis are receding, social aims that are
not only at the service of EMU are taking shape. Member States are encouraged to
introduce more open-ended contracts to replace existing temporary or precarious
contracts in order to improve employment perspectives for new recruits and to flexibilise
conditions for open-ended contracts in order to reduce rigidities on the labour market.
Furthermore, there is a renewed emphasis on the need to develop childcare institutions in
order to facilitate the entry of second earners onto the labour market (European
Commission, 2014). However, the resources available from the EU are very limited,
which means that Member States need first to have balanced budgets and healthy
economies to be able to make such investments. One possible institutional alteration
Table 2: Analytical results: EU integration levels of instruments of fiscal and social governance
Objectives Surveillance Enforcement
Fiscal policy coordination (to optimise the functioning of the Eurozone)
SGP (pre-crisis) High Medium Medium
Six-Pack High High Medium
Fiscal Compact High High High
Two-Pack High High High
Social and labour market policy coordination (to address issues of economic growth as well as social
sustainability)
Lisbon Strategy (pre-crisis) Medium Low Low
Europe 2020 Medium Medium Low
Euro-Plus-Pact High Medium Low
Social Investment Package and Youth Guarantee Medium Low/Medium
if co-funding
Low/Medium
if co-funding
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would be to consider such investments as productive in the institutional architecture
around EMU, if Europe is to improve and to maintain its social model.
Table 2 below summarises our findings with regard to the typology on EU
integration and involvement, which shows that since the crisis, the EU has been
much more involved in fiscal policy, a core issue for welfare states, but via the
framework created for governing the Eurozone. It also shows that while there have
been multiple initiatives integrated into and layered onto Europe 2020, these are
governed by relatively weak instruments and processes, thus affecting welfare state
reform through voluntarism only.
Conclusion
Since 2010, multiple new instruments have been created in the EU that affect welfare
reform to an unprecedented degree. First, new instruments and policies have been
grafted onto the existing institutional architecture to enhance the coordination of fiscal
policy. The new norms, such as structural deficit rules as well as stricter enforcement
and ex-ante surveillance of Member State budgets can be seen as a logical consequence
of having more integration in monetary policy. These new norms have a significant
impact on welfare states, as tight budgetary criteria will make expansionary public
spending difficult even in healthy economies, let alone in crisis-ridden countries. The
new instruments were agreed in unusually rapid succession in the context of an on-
going Eurozone crisis, leading to considerable institutional change in the EMU
architecture in a short period of time. The resultant institutional architecture holds
Member States accountable to the EU ex-ante and ex-post with regard to their budgets
and public expenditure, including social expenditure.
Europe 2020, the instrument designed to coordinate employment and social policy
and further develop the European Social Model, is comparatively weak compared
with the sharpened objectives, surveillance and enforcement mechanisms in EMU.
Although fostering social investment is on top of the EU social policy agenda, the
extremely strict fiscal discipline and balanced budget rules that are highly institutio-
nalised risk undermining the implementation of Europe 2020 which is now framed
by the social investment strategy.
In the current situation, what is needed in order to ensure a highly skilled labour
force together with economic growth is social investment. This requires financing in
the short-term in order to reap benefits in the long-term, such as, for example,
alternative forms of taxation and co-funding from the ESF, although the effect of this
is likely to be limited. The risks of missing the opportunity to develop a sustainable
welfare state and to focus only on a limited supply-side and liberal agenda is
particularly high in countries that are still struggling not only with the effects of the
crisis, but also with lack of institutions geared to make social investment sustainable –
starting with institutions for early childhood education and care, through schools,
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higher education and life-long learning. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that
EMU criteria and the new instruments developed for fiscal consolidation should be
altered to take account of investments made in such institutions, if the social
investment strategy is to be more than an unattainable ambition.
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Notes
1 In the framework developed by Hacker (2004) each type of change is associated with the types of
political dynamics (coalitions and veto players) underlying possible type of change. In this article, we
merely use the concepts to assess and to illustrate what types of changes have taken place in the
European economic and social governance processes, without considering the political dynamics
behind it.
2 Through the AGS, the EU Spring Council in March issues guidance covering fiscal, macroeconomic
structural reform and growth enhancement for national policies on the basis of QMV. The policy
priorities decided in the AGS should be included in Member States’ Stability or Convergence
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programmes (concerning monetary policy) devised within the SGP, and in National Reform
Programmes concerning economic, employment and social policies devised within Europe 2020 that
are to be submitted in April. Finally, the Commission proposes Country Specific Recommendations,
which are then to be adopted/altered by the Council before the summer.
3 The legislation consists of these six parts: (i) strengthening surveillance of budgetary positions and
coordination of economic policies, (ii) acceleration and clarification of the EDP through a Council
regulation, (iii) enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area through a regulation,
(iv) definition of a budgetary framework of the MS through a Directive, (v) prevention and correction
of macroeconomic imbalances through a regulation, (vi) enforcement of measures for correcting
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
4 The Fiscal Compact was signed in March 2012 by all EU members except the United Kingdom and the
Czech Republic and is the fiscal part of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance.
5 The difference between the actual ratio and SGP limit shall be reduced by an average rate of one-
twentieth per year as a benchmark.
6 The Two-Pack consists of two regulations (based on Art 136 TFEU) complementing the Six-Pack in
euro area countries to improve the transparency and coordination of Member States’ budgetary planning
and decision-making processes (European Commission, 2013b).
7 Applicable to those countries that are not under a macroeconomic adjustment programme.
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